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Abstract—eHealth, mHealth and eCare services are growing in 
numbers at a fast pace. This is mainly driven by technology and 
the societal challenges of an aging and more chronically 
burdened population while pressure on both human and 
financial resources increases. Though the adoption of these 
digital health services is challenging and experience difficulties. 
This work focusses on the main barriers that cause a ‘gap’ in the 
value network. Via case research following barriers are 
identified: 1) low willingness to pay, 2) unbalanced cost/benefit 
ratios of the actors or unfair cost allocation and 3) negative 
impacted business models. Furthermore the several roles of the 
government within the value network of digital health services 
are discussed and reflections and guidelines for digital health 
service developers are foreseen.  
Keywords-component; digital health services, value network 
analysis, adoption barriers, role of the government 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
mHealth (digital healthcare services supported by mobile 
devices), eHealth (ICT-supported health processes and 
services), eCare (eHealth services focusing on supporting care 
services) are all real buzz words these days. It can’t be of any 
surprise any more that due to the societal challenges of many 
developed countries (an aging population combined with a care 
system under financial pressure) interest in mHealt, eHealth, 
eCare (further referred to as digital health services) has been 
growing significantly. Many research indicates the potential 
value of these kind of ICT-supported care services [1]. These 
added values range from gains in process and administration 
time [2] and more complete health context information 
allowing to decrease the level of anxiety of the informal care 
giver.  All the potential value is expected to manifest in the 
more general form of decreased costs for care, more Quality Of 
Life (QOL) for the same amount of resources, or an overall 
increase in cost-efficiency. Meaning more QOL for the same 
amount of resources (e.g. time, financial resources, etc.) or the 
same QOL for a decreased amount of resources.  
Despite of the growing interest, no major adoption of 
digital health services, eCare in specific, can be noticed yet. 
This lack of adoption has several reasons [2]. Table I provides 
an overview of the commonly accepted barriers for the 
adoption of eCare, and digital health services in general. In 
particular, this work wants to address the importance of the role 
and impact of the government and the challenge of formulating 
win-win cost allocations to stimulate the adoption of digital 
health services.  
TABLE I.  CURRENT BARRIERS FOR THE ADOPTION OF DIGITAL HEALTH 
SERVICES[2] 
Barrier Description of adoption barrier 
A complex value 
network for eHealth 
services 
 
Integrating digital health services demands an 
intensive collaboration of several care actors. That 
is in contrast with the current and fragmented way 
of the often polarized care provisioning. Often the 
cost/benefit allocation for these actors is distorted. 
Added value is 
unclear, still needs 
to be proven or is 
hard to quantify 
Digital health services are new and innovative and 
therefore the impact of it is not proven yet. Also 
these services will impact more the quality of care 
and quality of life, which is harder to measure and 
quantify. 
Technological 
barriers 
There exist issues on data format standardization 
in order to guarantee exchangeability.  
A lack of financial 
support/ the unclear 
business model 
Integrating digital health services often require 
efforts from professional care providers. Without a 
clear financial structure or compensation, their 
motivation to adopt and support these services is 
and will remain low.  
Current perceptions 
of the involved 
actors on the 
healthcare system 
affects Willingness 
to pay 
Because of the installed care insurances, Western 
European citizens (and other countries where 
many healthcare costs are covered by public health 
insurances) are not used to pay (fully) for new 
medical devices or digital health services. 
Privacy concerns & 
legal issues 
Together with the use of ICT supported care 
services, automatically questions on data security 
and privacy rise. 
 
Last years, efforts have been in placed to tackle some these 
issues (e.g. standardization initiatives [3]).  
II. DIGITAL HEALTH SERVICES: OFTEN AN IMPERFECT 
VALUE NETWORK 
Although medicine is characterized by continuous 
improvement and innovations, integrating digital health 
services into existing multi-actor care processes and systems is 
often a hard task. Off all the existing barriers, the unclear 
business model and complex value network play major roles in 
the cumbersome uptake. In some cases adoption is slowed 
down or even blocked by an actor because his current business 
model is impacted negatively when integrating the new digital 
health service (see example cases).  
 Therefore, the incapability of formulating an overall 
accepted and sustainable value network, is one of the main 
challenges to solve for boosting the adoption.  A value network 
is the constellation of the different roles, their mutual value 
exchanges (e.g. monetary, tangible values e.g. goods or 
intangible values e.g. services) and actors involved to deliver 
the services to the customers [4]. 
The main reasons why formulating a sustainable value 
network and clear business model is challenging, are:  
First, there is no or a low willingness to pay. Integrating 
digital health services often requires additional investments in 
software (e.g. service subscriptions) and hardware (e.g. 
monitoring devices, sensor gateways, etc.). In many cases there 
is no reimbursement provided by health insurers for these kind 
of services. For now, patients and care receivers often have to 
pay themselves for additional digital health services. 
Many Western European and other developed countries 
have an installed healthcare system. In most cases this is 
(partly) paid for by public means and provides a basic 
healthcare insurance. On top of that, many people have 
additional private health insurances to extend the basic 
healthcare insurance. So for many health related incidents, 
people are covered by insurances. This given creates a gap 
between the perspectives on costs of healthcare: reimbursed 
and/or low out-of-the-pocket (OTP) costs for current care 
practices, versus non-reimbursed and unneglectable OTP costs 
for digital health services. Not surprisingly the overall 
willingness to pay of care receivers for digital health services is 
rather low for the time being.   
Secondly, cost allocation is difficult. Integrating or 
deploying digital services often requires many actors (e.g. care 
receiver, home care providers, general practitioner, informal 
care giver, specialist, etc.) to be on board, to be involved in the 
value network. In these multi-actor settings, cost allocations 
tend to be challenging. Meaning that there is often an 
unbalance between cost/benefit ratios of the involved actors. 
For example, the actor investing the most resources does not 
necessarily benefits the most. Often this actor will only accept 
this to a certain degree. Tackling the cost allocation can result 
in stronger value networks.      
Third, when costs are higher than the total benefits the 
business model is impacted in a negative way. In some cases, 
adopting or stimulating digital health services directly results in 
a negative impacted business model for one or more actors 
involved in the value network. For example a general 
practitioner who stimulates mHealth applications and monitors 
his patients, could in the long term experience a decreased 
number of visits of his patients as a result of the use of mHealth 
services. This would also affects his revenue streams. Thus 
besides their concerns about privacy protection and service-
usability [5], general practitioners could also experience a 
negative impact on their business model. Without official 
recognition of the impact of mHealth applications, it is unlikely 
that a financial framework will be installed to compensate the 
GP for his additional effort to monitor his patients while he 
experiences a decreased visiting frequency.  
Low willingness to pay [6], an unbalanced cost-allocation 
and a negative impacted business model are all potential causes 
why large scale adoption of digital health services could be 
slowed down or even be stopped by one or more actors [7].  
In the next section three real-life cases are discussed that all 
share the common challenge, being a blocked or slow adoption 
of the digital health service.  
III. EXAMPLES OF CHALLENGING VALUE NETWORKS 
Following three real-life cases in a Danish and Belgian 
context demonstrate how the integration of digital health 
services into current care practices impacts the business model 
of one or more actors, causing them to slow down or even 
block the adoption of the service. 
A. Case “Be Well Point”a Medi kiosk in Belgian pharmacies 
The first case dates from 2014 and concerns pharma 
companies installing ‘Point Of Care Testing’ (POCT) [8] in 
Belgian pharmacies. This device is an automated kiosk that is 
able to determine several bio parameters such as BMI, blood 
pressure, lipid profile, HbA1c, etc. After signing a digital 
informed consent, patients can perform these self-tests, 
supervised by the pharmacists and directly send the results to 
the general practitioners or any other care giver of choice.  
Although integrating self-test kiosks like ‘Be Well Point’ 
can be seen as positive thing to stimulate and allow people 
monitoring better their own health; the medical association 
blocked further adoption completely [9]. In their official 
communicated answer the medical association expresses their 
concerns about the reliability and quality of the tests and the 
procedures, as well on some privacy aspects. Focusing on the 
value network (see figure 1), it can be noticed that integrating a 
“Be Well Point” in pharmacies can lead to direct competition 
with general practitioners, leading to decreased visit 
frequencies and revenues.   
 
Figure 1.  Simplified value network for offering a digital service, indcating 
the competition between the new service and the general practitioner (case: 
“Be Well Point”) 
Although the integration of these self-test kiosks targeted 
bringing together patients, general practitioners or physicians 
in general and pharmacists and allow people monitoring 
important bio parameters, the final advice of medical 
association is that these practices are not deontological 
acceptable [9]. Further deployment of these medi-kiosks is not 
allowed.  
B. Case Telemonitoring heart failures 
Last decade, much research has been conducted on tele 
monitoring heart failure (HF) patients [10]. Closely monitoring 
patients suffering from HF, lowers the number of hospital 
readmissions and the mortality rate [10]. In most cases, it is the 
cardiologist or high skilled HF nurses who does the 
monitoring. But sometimes also the general practitioner is 
involved in the tele monitoring of his HF patients, since he 
performed the patient check-ups before integrating tele 
monitoring. 
Just like previous case, lack of a financial framework and a 
potentially decreased patient visit frequency result in the 
medical association blocking further adoption until there are 
clear business models proposed and reimbursements by the 
government [11].  
In fact, it can be noticed that in many cases integrating 
digital health services for which a medical actor is needed will 
adopt somewhat slower than would be the case without a 
medical actor in the value network. Sometimes it is because the 
physicians are reluctant because of privacy issues, medical 
evidence etc. In this case, it is up to the application and service 
developers to come up with a better product or service. But it 
shouldn’t occur that adoption is blocked because of a lack of 
financial structure or business model issues.  
C. Case launching an online national platform to improve 
quality of care of GPs  
A third case describes the deployment of a nationwide 
platform, Dak-e, that extracts all required info out of the 
electronic health records (EHR), maintained by the general 
practitioners [12]. The main goal of the platform is collect data 
for further developing and assuring the quality of the Danish 
care system. The data aggregation works in background 
processes so no extra effort is needed, on the condition that the 
general practitioner uses the International Classification of 
Primary Care coding system (ICPC codes). For the moment, 
focus is on a limited set of chronic diseases.  
Based on the gathered data, the platform provides insights 
and feedback for the general practitioners. Via national 
benchmarking best practices can easily be detected, learnt form 
and spread again. The anonymized data is also accessible for 
research centers. 
Although this platform could have a very beneficial impact 
(e.g. being the detection of best practices, insights why some 
treatments are preferred in some parts of the country, personal 
feedback for the general practitioners, etc.), initial adoption of 
the general practitioners remained low. Also in other countries 
a similar challenge can be noticed (e.g. low adoption of 
Vitalink [13]).  
Investigating the value network identifies partially the low 
adoption. Although the platform developers made it as a main 
requirement that the general practitioners shouldn’t be bothered 
with additional administrative tasks, the main condition for the 
Dak-e platform to work is respecting the ICPC-coding scheme.  
Learning and applying the ICPC rules, will require extra efforts 
from the GPs. A second reason for low adoption could be the 
‘Big Brother’ effect. Since Dak-e, a government related 
platform, provides insights and performs benchmarks between 
GPs, chances exist that this can be perceived as a controlling 
body.    
IV. THE GOVERNMENT AS AN IMPORTANT ACTOR 
As can be noticed in the case descriptions, the cause of a 
low or failed adoption of digital health services is often a gap 
in the value network or in the business model of a key-actor.  
Up to now healthcare industry players, physicians, care 
organizations and care receivers, expect the government and 
policy makers to provide the needed frameworks to operate in 
(e.g. legal, financial, etc.). Also an often recurring remark is the 
on the need for reimbursement of digital health services.  
The government can fulfill several roles within the value 
network of digital health services. The government can impact 
the adoption of services and/or close the gap in the value 
network by fulfilling on of the following roles: regulator, 
healthcare payer, digital health platform provider and adoption 
initiator (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.  The different roles the government can play simultanosuasly 
whitin a value network of digital health services. 
A. The government as regulator 
Bringing a digital health service to the market requires in 
most cases a quality label from a regulatory agency (FDA for 
the U.S., EC for European Countries, Health Canada, etc.). In 
short, this label indicates that the medical device or software 
application is safe to use.  
The requirement and degree of regulation for a device 
(depending on the country) can have a serious impact on the 
value network. For example, not all stores may sell medical 
devices or for instance when a digital health service is certified, 
it can increase the credibility for the general practitioners or 
physicians in general, etc. Depending on the intended use of 
the device or application or the risk it poses to patient, a certain 
level of certification can be obliged. When it’s not obliged, it 
can be a strategic choice of the developers.  
   Besides providing quality assuring regulation on the 
devices or services, the government can impact the value 
network via legislating (e.g. setting a deadline and forcing 
EHR-software companies to develop connector modules 
between the software suites and the national health platform).  
B. The government as payer 
In many countries where a public health care system is 
installed, one of the roles of the government is to act like a 
healthcare payer (often under the form of national health 
services or health care insurances paid via taxes). In addition, 
governmental institutions regulate reimbursement for health 
care (e.g. health care practices, drugs, medical devices, home 
care services, etc.).  
Obtaining reimbursement for health care requires proof of 
effectiveness (medical evidence based) and in most cases a 
more cost-effective outcome than the current alternative 
(higher incremental effectiveness-cost ratio (ICER)) [14]. 
Being reimbursed as digital health service is a desired scenario 
because in that case the WTP- barrier dissolves. But because of 
the explosive growth of digital health services (e.g. mHealth 
apps, monitoring devices, etc.) while budgets are limited, it is 
unlikely that current reimbursing systems will still be 
sustainable in the near future. On the other hand new 
reimbursement schemes will evolve.   
C. The government as platform provider 
For already two decades, many national governments of 
developed countries have been ordering an own online national 
healthcare platform to stimulate and facilitate sharing 
healthcare information between the correct actors in a secured 
way. First goals were: facilitating medical information sharing 
between hospitals, specialists and general practitioners, now 
also more patient centered services such as a vaccination 
journal, care journal and medication scheme are becoming 
available.  
Since these platforms are typically also responsible for 
official identity authorization and authentication of physicians, 
many private platforms use extensions of the national platform. 
Chances are likely that the national healthcare platform is a 
key-role in the value network of a digital health care service. 
D. The government as adoption initiator  
Adoption of these national platforms were typically slow. 
Not only because they were hard and cumbersome to use, but 
mainly because it required a cultural change, being the 
transition from a complete paper based administration towards 
a digital one.  
Nowadays, adoption for new types of platforms is still slow 
[13]. Reasons for this phenome can be the extra effort that is 
needed of the physicians without a being financially 
compensated for them. In other words, what’s in it for them? 
This could also indicate that the value added is not attractive 
enough for these actors. In order to overcome this issue, the 
government can provide incentives for using the system and 
sharing information with it. After a period of incentives, they 
could also penalize ignorant attitude of the users. This is what 
the Danish government did to boost the adoption of the Dak-e 
platform (91% in two years!) (See section III: examples of 
challenging value networks). The government threatened GPs 
to cancel their GP license if they wouldn’t use the Dak-e 
platform. So providing the correct incentives and penalizations 
is a governmental tool to initiate adoption of digital health care 
services.   
V. CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES  
Although the importance of the government as actor within 
the value network can be large (e.g. impact of being 
reimbursed, importance of new regulations, etc.), a fine balance 
must be found between the value network dependency of 
governmental actions or decisions and the potential roles of the 
government within the value network to fill the existing gaps. 
In general following guidelines are valid: 
First, setting up a business model or value network based 
on a potential change in regulation can hold a large business 
potential but also comes with uncertainty. Being able to foresee 
future adaptions of regulation and react quickly to changes in 
legislation, will be beneficial.     
Second, it’s not recommended to develop a value network 
that is strongly depended on reimbursement schemes if they are 
currently not installed yet. Though, the importance of chronic 
care will grow because of the aging population, so it can be 
expected that specific care pathways and reimbursement 
structures for certain chronic pathologies will be defined and 
developed further.   
Furthermore, a fair cost allocation for all involved actors is 
necessity for creating a sustainable value network [7]. An actor 
who is impacted negatively when digital health services are 
integrated is likely to block further adoption of the service. 
Determining a fair cost allocation is challenging because both 
cost and benefits for each actor should be quantified. The costs 
can often be quantified straight forward in terms of financial 
resources and time. The benefits on the other hand have two 
different components; 1) quantitative benefits (decrease in 
operational expenditures, less administration, less errors, etc.) 
and 2) qualitative benefits such as level of anxiety, level of 
peace of mind, decreased level of social isolation, etc.). 
Although there exist many tools [15] to quantify qualitative 
effects, measuring it often requires large trials. 
A fair cost/benefit ratio also means that digital health 
service providers, especially mHealth and eCare services have 
to be careful when it comes down to involving general 
practitioners in the value network. Whenever a service needs 
input from a general practitioner, compensation for this effort 
proved to be required unless the added value of the service is 
strong enough.   
The challenge of the willingness to pay of the customers of 
mHealth and eCare services is multi-faceted. Services which 
will be able to build up medical evidence of their impact 
probably will gain interest of health insurers. Financial 
intervention of health insurers will dissolve the WTP barrier. 
For services that have difficulties building up the medical 
evidence following remarks could be considered; First: the 
proposed added value is not strong enough since no actor wants 
to pay for it. Next, rethink the business model and value 
network, other cost allocation schemes could maybe result in a 
lowered cost for the end consumer. And finally, in some niche 
segments of the complete market for digital health services 
there is willingness to pay for these kind of services (e.g. the 
success of fitness and (health) tracking mobile applications). 
Together with the upcoming smartwatches, it can be expected 
that these niches will expand and impact the overall WTP for 
digital health services over time.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
eHealth, mHealth and eCare services (digital health 
services) are currently entering the market and the healthcare 
sector in large numbers. Due to still existing barriers overall 
adoption remains low. Especially defining a sustainable value 
network between the involved actors is often a hard task. This 
papers highlights three reasons for the gap in value network 
configurations: 1) currently low and unclear willingness to pay 
by service end users, 2) an unbalanced cost/benefit ratio, or 
unfair cost allocation between the involved actors and 3) a 
negative impacted business model of one or more actors 
resulting in a blocked or slowed down adoption of the service. 
Investigation of three different cases confirms these points of 
perspective.  
Although the role of the government in the value network 
can have a large impact on the adoption (e.g. reimbursement of 
the service), their complete potential impact is often not 
completely considered. Governments can steer, boost or block 
adoption by one of their following roles: 1) the government as 
regulator (e.g. providing regulations on service quality and 
labels, formulating new regulations impacting the business 
models and cases, etc.), 2) the government as payer (e.g. 
foreseeing reimbursement for the service), 3) the government 
as platform provider; many developed countries already have 
an established national platform for healthcare information 
sharing and authorization, which can impact the service 
provision and 4) the government as adoption initiator; by 
providing incentives or penalizations towards actors, the 
government can boost or block adoption.  
Based on these findings this work provides guidelines and 
considerations for integrating digital health services into the 
current care practices.  
VII. FUTURE WORK 
Since integrating digital health services often requires a 
multi-actor value network, determining a fair cost allocation is 
in many cases challenging. Initial work was done on how to 
obtain cost/benefit ratios that are acceptable for all actors 
involved in the value network [7]. Ongoing research focusses 
on further developing cost allocation methods that balance the 
cost/benefit ratios for all actors involved and for both 
quantitative and qualitative impacts, while optimizing the 
social impact (being cost-effective and qualitative care) of 
digital health service. 
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